Unmaking China's Development
Douban
The Function and Credibility of Institutions
何佩生 / Peter Ho
résumé
Why would the removal of authoritarian institutions in some developing countries lead to sustained socio-economic crisis, while others experience explosive growth despite 'persisting' informal, insecure and rent-seeking institutional arrangements? A key to solving this enigma lies in understanding China, a country where the paradoxes of development are highly visible. Peter Ho argues that understanding China's economy necessitates an analytical refocusing from Form to Function, detached from normative assumptions about institutional appearance and developing instead a 'Credibility Thesis'. In this reading, once institutions endogenously emerge and persist through actors' conflicting interactions, they are credible. Ho develops this idea theoretically, methodologically, and empirically by examining institutions around the sector that propelled, yet, simultaneously destabilizes development: real estate - land, housing and natural resources. Ho shows how this sector can further both our understanding of institutions and issues of capital, labor, infrastructure and technology.
contenus
Introduction: an archaeology of institutions
1. Institutional change in China's development: myths of tenure security and titling
2. In defense of endogenous development: urban and rural land markets
3. The 'Credibility Thesis' and its application to property rights
4. A theorem on dynamic disequilibrium: debunking path dependence and equilibrium
5. Understanding informality and insecurity: empiricism as basis for institutionalism
6. Making and unmaking the property bubble: boom, bust and unintended welfare?
7. Empty institutions, non-credibility and power: the grazing ban and mining
Conclusion: theoretical implications for capital, labor and beyond.