The Politics of Oligarchy
Douban
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
J. Mark Ramseyer / Frances McCall Rosenbluth
résumé
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
contenus
1. Introduction
2. The collapse of oligarchy: failed attempts at cartel-maintenance
3. Concession or facade: the Meiji constitution
4. Electoral rules and party competition: the struggle for political survival
5. The bureaucracy: who ruled whom?
6. The courts: who monitored whom?
7. The military: master of its own fate
8. Financial politics
9. Railroad politics
10. Cotton politics
11. Conclusion: institutions and political control
