Order without Law
Douban
How Neighbors Settle Disputes
Robert C. Ellickson
résumé
Robert Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules - social norms - without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law.
contenus
Introduction
Part I. Shasta County
1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry 15
2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass 29
3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes 40
4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences? 65
5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving
Livestock 82
6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances 104
Part II. A Theory of Norms
7. The System of Social Control 123
8. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control 137
9. The Puzzle of Cooperation 156
10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms 167
11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales 184
12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks 207
13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual,
and Hero Worship 230
14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom,
and Photocopies 240
Part III. The Future of Norms
15. Testing the Content of Norms 267
16. Conclusions and Implications 280
Appendix. Research Methods 289
Index 293
