暴力批判
The task of a critique of violence can be summarized as that of expounding its relation to law and justice. For a cause, however effective, becomes violent, in the precise sense of the word, only when it enters into moral relations. The sphere of these relations is defined by the concepts of law and justice. With regard to the first of these, it is clear that the most elementary relationship within any legal system is that of ends to means, and, furthermore, that violence can first be sought only in the realm of means, not in the realm of ends. These observations provide a critique of violence with premises that are more numerous and more varied than they may perhaps appear. For if violence is a means, a criterion for criticizing it might seem immediately available. It imposes itself in the question whether violence, in a given case, is a means to a just or an unjust end. A critique of it would then be implied in a system of just ends. This, however, is not so. For what such a system, assuming it to be secure against all doubt, would contain is not a criterion for violence itself as a principle, but, rather, the criterion for cases of its use. The question would remain open whether violence, as a principle, could be a moral means even to just ends. To resolve this question a more exact criterion is needed, which would discriminate within the sphere of means themselves, without regard for the ends they serve.
暴力的批判的任务，可以总结为阐述它与法律和正义的关系的任务。因为一个事业(cause)，无论多么有效，只有在它进入道德关系的时候，在（“暴力”）这个词的精确的意义上，才变得暴力。这些关系的（活动）范围，是由法律和正义的概念所界定的。就其中的第一个而言，显然，在一切法律体系中，最本质的关系，是目的与手段的关系，而且，更进一步地，我们只能在手段的领域，而不是目的的领域，首先去寻找暴力。这些观察提供了一种暴力的批判，它所需的前提比这些前提看起来那样更多也更为多样。因为如果暴力是一种手段，那么一种批判它的标准，看起来可能就是立即可用的了。它（这种标准）把自身强加于这样一个问题上，即，暴力，在给定的案例中，是不是达成一个正义的或不义的目的的手段。那么，对它（暴力）的批判就隐含在一个正义的目的的体系中了。然而，情况并非如此。因为这样一个体系——姑且假设它不受任何怀疑——包含的，不是用于作为一个原则的暴力本身的标准，而是，相反，用于使用暴力的案例的标准。这个问题依然会是开放的，即，暴力，作为一个原则，是否可以是一种——甚至对正义的目的来说——道德的手段。解决这个问题需要一个更加精密的标准，这个标准将在手段自身的领域内做出区分，而不考虑它们服务于何种目的。
The exclusion of this more precise critical approach is perhaps the predominant feature of a main current of legal philosophy: natural law. It perceives in the use of violent means to just ends no greater problem than a man sees in his "right" to move his body in the direction of a desired goal. According to this view (for which the terrorism in the French Revolution provided an ideological foundation), violence is a product of nature, as it were a raw material, the use of which is in no way problematical unless force is misused for unjust ends. If, according to the natural-law theory of the state, people give up all their violence for the sake of the state, this is done on the assumption (which Spinoza, for example, poses explicitly in his <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>) that the individual, before the conclusion of this rational contract, has <i>de jure</i> the right to use at will the violence that is <i>de facto</i> at his disposal. Perhaps these views have been recently rekindled by Darwin's biology, which, in a thoroughly dogmatic manner, regards violence as the only original means, besides natural selection, appropriate to all the vital ends of nature. Popular Darwinistic philosophy has often shown how short a step it is from this dogma of natural history to the still cruder one of legal philosophy, which holds that the violence that is, almost alone, appropriate to natural ends is thereby also legal.
排除这种更为精确的批判路径，也许是法哲学的一个主流：自然法的主要特征。它在达成正义目的的暴力手段的使用中察觉的最大的问题，不超过一个人在朝一个所欲望的方向移动他身体的“权利”中所发现的问题。根据这种观点（法国大革命中的恐怖主义为这种观点提供了一个意识形态的基础），暴力是自然的产物，好比一种原材料，对它的使用绝不成其为问题，除非武力被误用于不义的目的。如果，根据国家的自然法理论，人民为国家而放弃他们所有的暴力的话，那么，这是在这样的假设（斯宾诺莎，比如说，在他的《神学政治论》中明确地提出了这个假设）的基础之上完成的，即，个体，在这个理性的契约缔结之前，在法律上(de jure)具有任意使用事实上(de facto)由他随意支配的暴力的权利。也许，近来，达尔文的生物学重新激发了这些观点，这种生物学，以一种全然武断的方式，把暴力视作仅仅是除自然选择外，适用于所有自然的生存目的的，原始的手段。通俗的达尔文式的哲学经常表明这点，即从这种自然历史的信条，到一种还要更加残酷的法哲学的信条——后者坚持，适用于（几乎只有它适合这种目的）自然的目的的暴力，因此也是合法的——只有短短的一步之遥。
This thesis of natural law, which regards violence as a natural datum, is diametrically opposed to that of positive law, which sees violence as a product of history. If natural law can judge all existing law only in criticizing its ends, then positive law can judge all evolving law only in criticizing its means. If justice is the criterion of ends, legality is that of means. Notwithstanding this antithesis, however, both schools meet in their common basic dogma: just ends can be attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends. Natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to "justify" the means, positive law to "guarantee" the justness of the ends through the justification of the means. This antinomy would prove insoluble if the common dogmatic assumption were false, if justified means on the one hand and just ends on the other were in irreconcilable conflict. No insight into this problem could be gained, however, until the circular argument had been broken, and mutually independent criteria both of just ends and of justified means were established.
自然法的这个论点——它把暴力视为一种自然的事实(natural datum)的——与实证法的论点截然相反，后者把暴力视作历史的产物。如果说，自然法只有在对其（那些法律）目的的批判中才能评判所有现存的法律的话，那么，实证法就只有在对其（那些法律）手段的批判中才能评判所有演化的(evolving)法律。如果正义是目的的标准，那么合法律性(legality)就是手段的标准。然而，尽管有此对立，两个学派在它们的共同的基础信条上又走到了一起：正义的目的只能通过正当的(justified)手段来实现，而正当的手段只能用于正义的目的。自然法试图，通过目的的正义性，来“正当化(justify)”手段（使手段“正当化”），实证法则试图通过证明手段正当，来“保证”目的的正义性。事实将证明，这个二律背反是不可解决的——如果共同信条的假设是错误的，如果一方面正当的手段另一方面正当的目的处于不可调和的矛盾冲突之中的话。然而，我们不能获得任何深入这个问题的洞见，直到打破循环论证，并建立相互独立的正义的目的的，和正当的手段的标准。
The realm of ends, and therefore also the question of a criterion of justness, are excluded for the time being from this study. Instead, the central place is given to the question of the justification of certain means that constitute violence. Principles of natural law cannot decide this question, but can only lead to bottomless casuistry. For if positive law is blind to the absoluteness of ends, natural law is equally so to the contingency of means. On the other hand, the positive theory of law is acceptable as a hypothetical basis at the outset of this study, because it undertakes a fundamental distinction between kinds of violence independently of cases of their application. This distinction is between historically acknowledged, so-called sanctioned force and unsanctioned force. Although the following considerations proceed from this distinction, it cannot, of course, mean that given forms of violence are classified in terms of whether they are sanctioned or not. For in a critique of violence, a criterion for the latter in positive law can concern not its uses but only its evaluation. The question that concerns us is: What light is thrown on the nature of violence by the fact that such a criterion or distinction can be applied to it at all? In other words, what is the meaning of this distinction? That this distinction supplied by positive law is meaningful, based on the nature of violence, and irreplaceable by any other distinction will soon enough be shown, but at the same time light will be shed on the sphere in which alone such a distinction can be made. To sum up: if the criterion established by positive law to assess the legality of violence can be analyzed with regard to its meaning, then the sphere of its application must be criticized with regard to its value. For this critique a standpoint outside positive legal philosophy but also outside natural law must be found. The extent to which it can be furnished only by a philosophico-historical view of law will emerge.
目的的领域，以及因此而来的正义的标准的问题，暂时被排除在本研究之外。相反，本研究的中心将留给构成暴力的特定手段的正当化的问题。自然法的原则不能决定这个问题，而只能引向无止境的诡辩。因为如果说实证法对目的的绝对性是盲目的话，那么自然法同样看不到手段的偶然性。另一方面，在研究的开端，法律的实证理论可以接受为一个假设性的基础，因为它在独立于暴力的应用的，不同种类的暴力之间进行了基本的区分。这一区分是在得到历史性承认的、所谓的受许可的武力和未受许可的武力之间做出的。尽管接下来的思考从这一区分出发，当然，也不是说，既定形式的暴力，是从它们是否得到认可方面来分类的。因为在一种暴力的批判中，实证法中暴力的标准与它的使用无关而只关涉它的评价。与我们有关的问题是：这一事实，即这样一种标准或区分从根本上说可应用于它（暴力）身上，能给我们带来什么关于暴力本质的启示？换言之，这一区分的意义是什么？由实证法提供的这一区分——基于暴力的本质——是有意义的，且不可为其他任何区分所取代，这一观点将很快得到展示，但同时，那个领域——只有在这个领域上才能做出这样的区分——也会变得一目了然。总而言之：如果我们可以在这一标准的意义方面，分析实证法为评估暴力的合法性而建立的标准的话，那么，我们就必须从其价值方面，来批判其应用的领域。我们必须为这种批判寻找一个既外在于实证法哲学也外在于自然法的立足点。它（这一立足点）在何种程度上只能为一种关于法律的，哲学-历史的观点来提供，将显现出来。
The meaning of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence is not immediately obvious. The misunderstanding in natural law by which a distinction is drawn between violence used for just ends and violence used for unjust ends must be emphatically rejected. Rather, it has already been indicated that positive law demands of all violence a proof of its historical origin, which under certain conditions is declared legal, sanctioned. Since the acknowledgment of legal violence is most tangibly evident in a deliberate submission to its ends, a hypothetical distinction between kinds of violence must be based on the presence or absence of a general historical acknowledgment of its ends. Ends that lack such acknowledgment may be called natural ends; the other type may be called legal ends. The differing function of violence, depending on whether it serves natural or legal ends, can be most clearly traced against a background of specific legal conditions. For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will relate to contemporary European conditions.
合法的和不合法的暴力之间的区分的意义一眼看上去并不明显。必须断然拒绝自然法中的这一误解——据此，人们在用于正义目的的暴力和用于不义目的的暴力之间做出了（错误的）区分。相反，我们已经指出，实证法对所有暴力，索要一个关于其历史起源的证据，后者在特定的条件下被宣称是合法的，受认可的。由于对合法暴力的承认，在一种慎重的对其目的的服从中，最为确实明显，因此，各种暴力之间的假设性的区分，必须建基于对其目的的普遍历史承认的在场或阙如（即建立在其目的是否得到普遍的历史承认的基础上——译注）。缺乏这种承认的目的可被称作自然目的；另一种类型的目的则可被称作（合）法律的目的。暴力的不同功能，取决于它是服务于自然目的还是（合）法律的目的，我们可以在特定法律条件的背景中最为清晰地追溯这些不同功能。为简单起见，接下来的讨论将关于当代欧洲的条件。
Characteristic of these, so far as the individual as legal subject is concerned, is the tendency to deny the natural ends of such individuals in all those cases in which such ends could, in a given situation, be usefully pursued by violence. This means: this legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power. Indeed, the system strives to limit by legal ends even those areas in which natural ends are admitted in principle within wide boundaries, like that of education, as soon as these natural ends are pursued with an excessive measure of violence, as in the laws relating to the limits of educational authority to punish. It can be formulated as a general maxim of present-day European legislation that all the natural ends of individuals must collide with legal ends if pursued with a greater or lesser degree of violence. (The contradiction between this and the right to self-defense will be resolved in what follows.) From this maxim it follows that law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the legal system. As a danger nullifying legal ends and the legal executive? Certainly not; for then what would be condemned would not be violence as such but only that which is directed to illegal ends. It will be argued that a system of legal ends cannot be maintained if natural ends are anywhere still pursued violently. In the first place, however, this is mere dogma. To counter it one might perhaps consider the surprising possibility that the law's interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is explained not by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by the intention of preserving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law. The same may be more drastically suggested, for one reflects how often the figure of the "great" criminal, however repellent his ends may have been, has aroused the secret admiration of the public. This can result not from his deed but only from the violence to which it bears witness. In this case, therefore, the violence that present-day law is seeking in all areas of activity to deny the individual appears really threatening, and arouses even in defeat the sympathy of the masses against the law. By what function violence can with reason seem so threatening to the law, and be so feared by it, must be especially evident where its application, even in the present legal system, is still permissible.
这些（功能）的特征，就作为法律主体的个体而言，是在所有情况下——在这些情况下，可以在既定情景中用暴力来有效地追求自然目的——否定这些个体的自然目的的倾向。这意味着：这个法律系统试图在，所有能用暴力来有效追求个体的目的的地方，建立只有通过法律的力量才能实现的法律的目的。确实，那个系统力图通过法律的目的，来限制甚至那些自然目的在原则上得到广泛容许的区域——如教育的区域，只要人们用过度的暴力手段来追求这些自然目的，就像在关于限制教育权威惩罚的法律中那样。可以把这点表达为当前欧洲立法的普遍准则，即，个体的所有自然目的，如果以程度或高或低的暴力来追求的话，就必然与法律的目的冲突。（这点与自卫的权利之间的矛盾在后面会得到解决。）从这条准则出发，随之而来的是，法律把个体手中的暴力看作一种会损坏法律系统的危险。是看作一种会使合法律的目的和合法律的管理无效的危险吗？当然不是；因为是那样的话，那么，受到谴责的就不会是暴力本身，而只会被导向不合法律的目的的暴力了。人们会争论说，如果在哪里都还可以暴力地追求自然目的的话，那么合法目的的系统就不可能维持下去。然而，首先，这只是一种教条。要反驳它，人们也许可以考虑这样一个令人惊讶的可能性，即法律在个体面前垄断暴力的兴趣，不是为保护合法目的的意图，而是为保护法律本身的意图所解释（即法律之所以要从个体手里攫取并垄断暴力不是因为它要保护合法律的目的，而是因为它要自保，即保护法律本身——译注）；暴力，当不在法律手中的时候，不是因为它可能追求的目的，而仅仅是因为它之存在于法律之外，而对法律产生威胁。我们可以更加激烈地指出同样的这点，因为人们会想到，“大”罪犯的形象，无论他的目的是如何地令人厌恶，却经常引起公众隐秘的钦佩。这不可能是由他的行为引起，而只可能是它（他的行为）见证的暴力的结果。因此，在这种情况下，当今法律力图在所有活动领域中拒绝给予个体的那种暴力看起来是真正威胁性的，并且甚至在失败时这种暴力会引起群众悖逆法律的同情。由于何种功能暴力才可能有理由地，看起来对法律产生了如此之大的威胁，并如此地为法律所畏惧，这点，在其应用——甚至在当下的法律系统中——仍然得到准许的地方必然是特别明显的。
This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. Today organized labor is, apart from the state, probably the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to concede the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly a right not to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer, strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer. The moment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in the face of a revolutionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse (since the right to strike was not "so intended") and will take emergency measures. For the state retains the right to declare that a simultaneous use of strikes in all industries is illegal, since the specific reasons for strikes admitted by legislation cannot be prevalent in every workshop. In this difference of interpretation is expressed the objective contradiction in the legal situation, whereby the state acknowledges a violence whose ends, as natural ends, it sometimes regards with indifference but in a crisis (the revolutionary general strike) confronts inimically. For however paradoxical this may appear at first sight, even conduct involving the exercise of a right can nevertheless, under certain circumstances, be described as violent. More specifically, such conduct, when active, may be called violent if it exercises a right in order to overthrow the legal system that has conferred it; when passive, it is nevertheless to be so described if it constitutes extortion in the sense explained above. It therefore reveals an objective contradiction in the legal situation, but not a logical contradiction in the law, if under certain circumstances the law meets the strikers, as perpetrators of violence, with violence. For in a strike the state fears above all else that function of violence which it is the object of this study to identify as the only secure foundation of its critique. For if violence were, as first appears, merely the means to secure directly whatever happens to be sought, it could fulfill its end as predatory violence. It would be entirely unsuitable as a basis for, or a modification to, relatively stable conditions. The strike shows, however, that it can be so, that it is able to found and modify legal conditions, however offended the sense of justice may find itself thereby. It will be objected that such a function of violence is fortuitous and isolated. This can be rebutted by a consideration of military force.
在阶级斗争中，在工人得到保障的罢工的权利的形式中尤其如此。今天有组织的劳工，是与国家分离的，它很可能是唯一有资格使用暴力的法律主体。与这种观点相悖——当然会有这样的反对，即一种不作为，一种不行动——事实上罢工就是这么一回事——不可能被描述为暴力。这样的考虑无疑使国家权力更容易承认罢工的权利，一旦这不再可避免。但其（这种反对意见）的真实性并不是无条件的，并因此也不是不受限制的。确实，一种行动、或服务的不作为，在它只相当于“切断关系”的地方，可能是一种完全非暴力的、纯粹的手段。而就像在国家，或法律眼中那样，让步给劳工的罢工的权利，当然是这样的一种权利，它不是使用暴力的权利，而是，相反，逃避为雇主所间接施加的暴力的权利；符合这点的罢工无疑会不时地发生并仅涉及从雇主那里的“撤退”或“疏离”。然而，暴力的时刻，是必然以勒索(extortion)的形式，被引入这种不作为的——如果它（这种不作为）发生在对在特定环境下恢复已悬置的行动的有意识的准备的背景中，这样的环境，要么和这种行动没有丝毫关系，要么仅仅是从表面上对它修正。从这种方式来理解的话，罢工的权利，从劳工的角度——这与国家的看法是相对的——来看，就构成了在达到特定目的（的过程）中使用暴力的权利。这两个概念之间的对立，尽其苦涩地出现在革命总罢工面前。在这（总罢工）之中，劳工会永远诉诸它罢工的权利，而国家则会把这一诉求称作滥用（由于罢工的权利不是“那么地蓄意”）并且会采取紧急措施。因为国家保有权力来宣布，在所有有组织的劳动(in all industries，或在所有产业)中同时进行罢工，是非法的，因为法律容许的具体特殊的罢工理由，不可能流行于每一个工厂。在这种阐释的差异中，法律情景中的那个客观的矛盾得到了表达——据此，国家承认这样一种暴力，其目的，作为自然地目的，（国家）有时会漠然视之但在危机（革命总罢工）中则会进行敌意的对抗。因为无论这点一眼看上去显得有多么矛盾，不管怎么说，甚至涉及一项权利行使的行动，在特定的环境下，都可能被描述为暴力的。更为具体地，这样的行动，在主动的时候，如果它是为推翻授予它权利的法律系统而行使权利的话，那么，它也可以被称为暴力的（行动）；在被动的时候，如果它构成在以上解释的意义上的勒索的话，那么无论如何，它也会被描述为暴力的（行动）。它因此也就解释了法律情景中的一个客观的矛盾，但这并不是一个法律中的逻辑的矛盾——在特定环境下，法律是否要用暴力来迎接作为暴力的施行者的罢工者。因为在罢工中，国家先于所有其他的一切而恐惧的首先是暴力的那种功能——本研究的目的也就在于，辨识作为其（暴力）批判的唯一稳固的根基的这一功能。因为如果暴力，像一眼看上去那样，仅仅是一种手段，来直接保护恰巧要追求的无论什么东西，那么，它就可以作为掠夺性的暴力而满足它的目的。那么它就完全不适合作为相对稳定的境况之基础，或之修正。然而，罢工表明，它可以成为这样的基础和修正，它有能力奠立和修正法律的境况，无论在这里正义感受到多大的冒犯。会有人反对说暴力的这样的功能是意外的和个别的。通过对军事武力的思考可以对此进行反驳。
The possibility of military law rests on exactly the same objective contradiction in the legal situation as does that of strike law-namely, on the fact that legal subjects sanction violence whose ends remain for the sanctioners natural ends, and can therefore in a crisis come into conflict with their own legal or natural ends. Admittedly, military force is used quite directly, as predatory violence, toward its ends. Yet it is very striking that even-or, rather, precisely-in primitive conditions that scarcely know the beginnings of constitutional relations, and even in cases where the victor has established himself in invulnerable possession, a peace ceremony is entirely necessary. Indeed, the word "peace," in the sense in which it is the correlative to the word "war" (for there is also a quite different meaning, similarly unmetaphorical and political, the one used by Kant in talking of "Eternal Peace"), denotes this a priori, necessary sanctioning, regardless of all other legal conditions, of every victory. This sanction consists precisely in recognizing the new conditions as a new "law," quite regardless of whether they need de facto any guarantee of their continuation. If, therefore, conclusions can be drawn from military violence, as being primordial and paradigmatic of all violence used for natural ends, there is a lawmaking character inherent in all such violence. We shall return later to the implications of this insight. It explains the abovementioned tendency of modern law to divest the individual, at least as a legal subject, of all violence, even that directed only to natural ends. In the great criminal this violence confronts the law with the threat of declaring a new law, a threat that even today, despite its impotence, in important instances horrifies the public as it did in primeval times. The state, however, fears this violence simply for its lawmaking character, being obliged to acknowledge it as lawmaking whenever external powers force it to concede them the right to conduct warfare, and classes force it to concede them the right to strike.
军事法的可能性正好依赖于罢工法依赖的那同一个法律情景中的客观矛盾——也即，在于这样一个事实，即法律主体认可，那种对认可者来说，其目的依然是自然目的，并因此而可能在危机中与他们自己的法律的或自然目的发生冲突的暴力。诚然，军事武力，作为掠夺性的暴力，被相当直接地用于它的目的。然而非常令人震惊的是甚至——或者，更确切地说——在很少知道政治构造关系之开端的原始境况中，以及甚至在胜利者已经确立自己无懈可击的地位的情况下，和平的仪式也是完全必要的。确实，“和平”这个词，在这样一个意义上——在这个意义上，它与“战争”一词相关（因为[它]还有一个非常不同的意义，在非隐喻和政治性上[与这个意义]类似的，康德在谈论“永久和平”时使用的那个意义）——指出这是先验的、必要的对一切胜利的认可，而无论其他所有的法律境况。这种许可确切来说就在于把新的境况承认为新的“法律”，而相当不考虑它们事实上是否需要任何关于其连续性的保证。如果，因此，我们可以从军事暴力——作为所有用于自然目的的暴力中最为原始、最具有示范性的（暴力）——得出的出结论的话，那就是，一种立法的特征内在于所有这样的暴力之中。稍后我们还会回到这一洞见的意义。它解释了上面提到的，现代法律剥夺个体，至少是作为法律主体的个体的所有暴力——甚至那些只导向自然目的的暴力——的倾向。在伟大的罪犯身上，这种暴力以宣布新法的威胁对抗法律，这个威胁，在今天，尽管无力，在重大的实例中还是会像它在原始时代那样使公众恐惧。然而，国家害怕这种暴力，仅仅是因为它立法的特征——无论何时，只要外国迫使它（国家）承认它们开战的权利，以及，只要阶级迫使它承认它们罢工的权利，它就被迫承认它（暴力）是立法性的。
If in the last war the critique of military violence was the starting point for a passionate critique of violence in general-which taught at least one thing, that violence is no longer exercised and tolerated naively-nevertheless, violence was subject to criticism not only for its lawmaking character but also, perhaps more annihilatingly, for another of its functions. For a duality in the function of violence is characteristic of militarism, which could come into being only through general conscription. Militarism is the compulsory, universal use of violence as a means to the ends of the state. This compulsory use of violence has recently been scrutinized as closely as, or still more closely than, the use of violence itself. In it violence shows itself in a function quite different from its simple application for natural ends. It consists in the use of violence as a means toward legal ends. For the subordination of citizens to laws-in the present case, to the law of general conscription-is a legal end. If that first function of violence is called the lawmaking function, this second will be called the law-preserving function. Since conscription is a case of law-preserving violence that is not in principle distinguished from others, a really effective critique of it is far less easy than the declamations of pacifists and activists suggest. Rather, such a critique coincides with the critique of all legal violence-that is, with the critique of legal or executive force-and cannot be performed by any lesser program. Nor, of course-unless one is prepared to proclaim a quite childish anarchism-is it achieved by refusing to acknowledge any constraint toward persons and by declaring, "What pleases is permitted." Such a maxim merely excludes reflection on the moral and historical spheres, and thereby on any meaning in action, and beyond this on any meaning in reality itself, which cannot be constituted if "action" is removed from its sphere. More important is the fact that even the appeal, so frequently attempted, to the categorical imperative, with its doubtless incontestable minimum program - act in such a way that at all times you use humanity both in your person and in the person of all others as an end, and never merely as a means-is in itself inadequate for such a critique. For positive law, if conscious of its roots, will certainly claim to acknowledge and promote the interest of mankind in the person of each individual. It sees this interest in the representation and preservation of an order imposed by fate. While this view, which claims to preserve law in its very basis, cannot escape criticism, nevertheless all attacks that are made merely in the name of a formless "freedom" without being able to specify this higher order of freedom remain impotent against it. And they are most impotent of all when, instead of attacking the legal system root and branch, they impugn particular laws or legal practices that the law, of course, takes under the protection of its power, which resides in fact that there is only one fate and that what exists, and in particular what threatens, belongs inviolably to its order. For law-preserving violence is a threatening violence. And its threat is not intended as the deterrent that uninformed liberal theorists interpret it to be. A deterrent in the exact sense would require a certainty that contradicts the nature of a threat and is not attained by any law, since there is always hope of eluding its arm. This makes it all the more threatening, like fate, which determines whether the criminal is apprehended. The deepest purpose of the uncertainty of the legal threat will emerge from the later consideration of the sphere of fate in which it originates. There is a useful pointer to it in the sphere of punishments. Among them, since the validity of positive law has been called into question, capital punishment has provoked more criticism than all others. However superficial the arguments may in most cases have been, their motives were and are rooted in principle. The opponents of these critics felt, perhaps without knowing why and probably involuntarily, that an attack on capital punishment assails not legal measure, not laws, but law itself in its origin. For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence. In agreement with this is the fact that the death penalty in primitive legal systems is imposed even for such crimes as offenses against property, to which it seems quite out of "proportion." Its purpose is not to punish the infringement of law but to establish new law. For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the latter knows itself to be infinitely remote from conditions in which fate might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence. Reason must, however, attempt to approach such conditions all the more resolutely, if it is to bring to a conclusion its critique of both lawmaking and law preserving violence.
如果在最后一场战争中，对军事暴力的批判是一种充满激情的对一般的暴力的批判的起点的话——这至少教导我们一件事情，即暴力不再被使用，不再受到天真的宽容——无论如何，暴力臣服于批判不仅因为它立法的特征，也因为，也许更能废止法律的是，它的另一种功能。因为暴力功能中的二元性，乃是军国主义的特征，后者只有通过普遍兵役制度才可能存在。军国主义是，对作为达成国家目的之手段的暴力的强制、普遍的使用。近来，这种对暴力的强制使用已经受到了和对暴力本身的使用一样细致的，或者说更加细致的审查。在其中，暴力在这样一种功能中展示自身，这种功能特别不同于它为了自然目的的简单使用。这种功能就在于对作为一种面向合法目的之手段的暴力的使用。因为公民对法律的服从——在眼下的情况中，即对普遍兵役法的服从——是一个合法目的。如果暴力的第一种功能叫做立法功能的话，那么，这第二种功能就可被称作护法功能。由于兵役制度是原则上与其他暴力并无区别的护法暴力的一个例子，对它的真正有效的批判，远不比和平主义者和行动主义者提出的雄辩要容易。毋宁说，这样一种批判与对所有合法暴力的批判——也即，与对合法的或行政的武力的批判——是一致的并且这种批判不可能由任何更小的方案来完成（即对兵役制度的批判是实现对合法律暴力的批判的最简计划——译注）。当然，也不可能通过拒绝承认任何对个人的限制，以及通过宣告“令人高兴的都是被允许的”来实现这点——除非你愿意宣告一种相当幼稚的无政府主义。这样一个准则仅仅把关于道德和历史领域的思考，和由此而来的关于行动的任何意义的思考，以及在此之外，关于现实本身的任何意义的思考——而如果“行动”被移除到其（现实）领域之外，这种意义将不可能被构成——排除在外。更为重要的是这样一个事实，即甚至人们如此经常尝试的，对定言令式(categorical imperative)的诉求，及其无疑不可辨驳的最低纲领——以这样一种方式行动：无论什么时候，你都要把你个体中的和所有他人个体中的人性当作目的，而绝不仅仅把它当作某种手段来使用——本身对这样一种批判来说是不够的。因为实证法，如果意识到它的根源的话，当然会宣称要承认和提升每个人的个体中的人类利益。它在对一种由命运强加之秩序的再现和保护中看到这一利益。尽管这种观点，它声称保护法律乃是它的基础，不可能逃避批判，但是，所有只是在一种无形的“自由”的名义下做出的，却没有能力具化这种更高的自由秩序的攻击，对它来说依然是无力的。而它们最为无力的时候，是在不去攻击法律系统，而是去在质疑法律当然地置于其力量——而法律的力量则在于这样一个事实，即只存在一种命运，以及存在着的、特别是产生威胁的东西，不可侵犯地属于它的秩序——保护之下的特别的法律或法律实践的时候。因为护法的暴力是一种威胁性的暴力。而它的威胁，并非是被用作如无知的自由主义理论家们所阐释那样的威慑。准确地说，威慑要求一种，与威胁之本质相悖的确定性，且这种确定性不被任何法律达到，因为总是存在躲避它的权力的希望。这使得它更具威胁性——和命运一样，后者决定罪犯是否被捕。法律的威胁的不确定性的最深刻的目的将显现于稍后关于命运领域——它（法律）就起源于这个领域——的思考。对此，惩罚的领域中有一个有用的线索。在惩罚中，由于实证法的有效性遭到了质疑，死刑就引起了比所有其他惩罚更多的批判。无论在大多数情况下这些论证有多么肤浅，这些论证的动机在过去和现在都植根于原则。这些批判的论敌们感到——也许它们并不知道为什么且很可能是身不由己地——对死刑的攻击所指责的并不是法律措施，也不是法律，而是就其起源而言的法律本身。因为如果暴力，为命运所加冕的暴力，是法律的起源的话，那么，人们就很可能会设想，在最高的暴力，即凌驾于生死之上的暴力，在法律系统中发生的地方，法律的起源公然而吓人地突入存在。与此一致的是这样一个事实，在原始法律系统中，死刑甚至被强加在诸如侵犯财产权此类的罪行之上，对这些罪行来说，它看起来相当不相称。它的目的不是惩罚对法律的侵犯，而是要建立新法。因为法律，在对凌驾于生死之上的暴力的行使中，比在其他任何法律行动中更多地重新确证自身。但在这种暴力中，法律中某种腐败的东西也被揭露了出来，首先对一种更好的感受力揭露出来，因为后者知道自身无限地远离这样的境况，其中，命运可以在这样的判决中专横地展示自身。然而，理性必然试图更为决绝地切入这样的境况，如果它要完成它对立法的护法的暴力的批判的话。
In a far more unnatural combination than in the death penalty, in a kind of spectral mixture, these two forms of violence are present in another institution of the modern state: the police. True, this is violence for legal ends (it includes the right of disposition), but with the simultaneous authority to decide these ends itself within wide limits (it includes the right of decree). The ignominy of such an authority-which is felt by few simply because its ordinances suffice only seldom, even for the crudest acts, but are therefore allowed to rampage all the more blindly in the most vulnerable areas and against thinkers, from whom the state is not protected by law lies in the fact that in this authority the separation of lawmaking and law-preserving violence is suspended. If the first is required to prove its worth in victory, the second is subject to the restriction that it may not set itself new ends. Police violence is emancipated from both conditions. It is lawmaking, because its characteristic function is not the promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree, and law-preserving, because it is at the disposal of these ends. The assertion that the ends of police violence are always identical or even connected to those of general law is entirely untrue. Rather, the "law" of the police really marks the point at which the state, whether from impotence or because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. Therefore, the police intervene "for security reasons" in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists, when they are not merely, without the slightest relation to legal ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by ordinances, or simply supervising him. Unlike law, which acknowledges in the "decision" determined by place and time a metaphysical category that gives it a claim to critical evaluation, a consideration of the police institution encounters nothing essential at all. Its power is formless, like its nowhere-tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states. And though the police may, in particulars, appear the same everywhere, it cannot finally be denied that in absolute monarchy, where they represent the power of a ruler in which legislative and executive supremacy are united, their spirit is less devastating than in democracies, where their existence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to the greatest conceivable degeneration of violence.
以一种比在死刑中更为不自然得多的组合，以一种幽灵般混合物的形式，这两种形式的暴力（暴力的这两种形式）在现代国家的另一种制度中在场/存在：警察（制度）。确实，这是用于合法律的目的（它包含处置的权利）的暴力，但同时它又具有一种权威来在宽泛的限度内决定这些目的本身（它包含[颁布]法令[decree]的权利）。这样一种权威的无耻——只有少数人感到这点，而这仅仅是因为，它的训令很少是足够的，即使对最残酷的行为来说，因此它被允许更为盲目地在最为脆弱的领域、为反对思想家们而暴行，而法律并没有保护国家不受思想家的攻击——在于这样一个事实，即在这种权威中，立法和护法之暴力的分离遭到了悬置。如果前者需要在胜利中证明自己的价值的话，那么，后者则服从于它不可以为自己设立新的目的的限制。警察暴力从这两种境况中解放了出来。它是立法性的，因为它的特征功能并不是对法律的施行(promulgation)而是对，对任何法令的（合）法律的要求的断言，它也是护法性的，因为它自有这些目的(at the disposal of these ends)。认为警察暴力总是等同于或甚至与一般法的暴力相关的断言是完全错误的。相反，警察的“法律”实际上标志着这样一个点，在这个点上，国家，无论是出于无能还是因为在任何法律系统内部的固有的关联，都不再能够通过法律系统来保障它不惜一切代价欲望达成的，经验的目的(empirical ends)。因此在数不尽的案例——在那样的情况下，不存在任何清晰的法律情景——中，在这些案例与合法律的目的没有丝毫关系的时候，警察“为安全的理由”而进行干涉，通过一种为训令所管制的生活，作为一种残酷的妨碍而伴随公民，或简单地对他进行监督。和法律不一样，法律在为时间和地点所决定的“决定”中承认一个给它一种对决定性的评价的要求的，形而上学的范畴，而警察制度的考虑则根本不会早于任何本质性的东西。它的权力是无形式的，就像它在文明国家的生活中的，无处可见、全面渗透、幽灵般的存在/在场那样。而尽管警察可以，特别地，在任何地方出现，最终人们却不能否定这点，即在绝对君主制中，警察代表/再现了统治者的权力，而在统治者身上，立法的和行政/执行的最高权力是统一的——在这里，它们的精神比在民主制中的破坏性更低，在民主制度中，它们的存在，不为这样的关系所拔高，（从而）见证了暴力可设想的最大的堕落/退化。
All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all validity. It follows, however, that all violence as a means, even in the most favorable case, is implicated in the problematic nature of law itself. And if the importance of these problems cannot be assessed with certainty at this stage of the investigation, law nevertheless appears, from what has been said, in so ambiguous a moral light that the question poses itself whether there are no other than violent means for regulating conflicting human interests. We are above all obligated to note that a totally nonviolent resolution of conflicts can never lead to a legal contract. For the latter, however peacefully it may have been entered into by the parties, leads finally to possible violence. It confers on each party the right to resort to violence in some form against the other, should he break the agreement. Not only that; like the outcome, the origin of every contract also points toward violence. It need not be directly present in it as lawmaking violence, but is represented in it insofar as the power that guarantees a legal contract is, in turn, of violent origin even if violence is not introduced into the contract itself. When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay. In our time, parliaments provide an example of this. They offer the familiar, woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to which they owe their existence. Accordingly, in Germany in particular, the last manifestation of such forces bore no fruit for parliaments. They lack the sense that they represent a lawmaking violence; no wonder they cannot achieve decrees worthy of this violence, but cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent manner of dealing with political affairs. This remains, however, a "product situated within the mentality of violence, no matter how it may disdain all open violence, because the effort toward compromise is motivated not internally but from outside, by the opposing effort, because no compromise, however freely accepted, is conceivable without a compulsive character. 'It would be better otherwise' is the underlying feeling in every compromise."3-Significantly, the decay of parliaments has perhaps alienated as many minds from the ideal of a nonviolent resolution of political conflicts as were attracted to it by the war. The pacifists are confronted by the Bolsheviks and Syndicalists. These have effected an annihilating and on the whole apt critique of present-day parliaments. Nevertheless, however desirable and gratifying a flourishing parliament might be by comparison, a discussion of means of political agreement that are in principle nonviolent cannot be concerned with parliamentarianism. For what a parliament achieves in vital affairs can be only those legal decrees that in their origin and outcome are attended by violence.
所有作为手段的暴力要么是立法性的要么是护法性的。如果它声称不具有这两个谓项中的任何一个的话，那么它就失去了所有的有效性。然而，随之而来的是，所有作为手段的暴力，甚至在最令人赞同的情况下，也是内涵于法律本身的成问题的本质中的。而如果说在本研究阶段我们还不能对这些问题的重要性进行确定的评估的话，法律看起来，从已经说过的内容来看，却在这样一种模棱两可的道德之光下显现，以至于不由地出现了这样一个问题，即是否存在暴力以外的，管制相互冲突的人类利益的手段。我们首先应该注意，（对）这些冲突的一种完全非暴力的解决方案是不可能导致某种法律契约的。因为后者（法律契约），无论（缔约的）各方可能如何和平地进入它（法律契约），最终将导致可能的暴力。它授予各方诉诸于某种形式的暴力来对付另一方的权利——如果他（对方）破坏协定的话。不仅如此；和结果一样，一切契约的起源也都指向暴力。它（暴力）无需作为立法性的暴力在其（契约）中直接在场，但就此而言——即保障法律契约的力量，反过来，亦是起源于暴力，即便在暴力本身没有被引进契约而言也如此——它再现/表征于契约之中。在对法律制度中暴力的潜在的在场的意识消失的时候，制度也就衰败了。在我们的时代，议会提供了一个这样的例子。它们提出了那熟悉而可悲的景观，因为它们不再对革命的武力有所意识，而它们的存在恰恰归功于革命的武力。相应地，尤其在德国，这种武力的最后显现并没有使议会有所收获。它们缺乏这样的感觉，即它们表征/再现了一种立法性的暴力；它们不能获得值得这种武力（去争取）的法令，而只是在妥协中培养一种处理政治事务的在想像上非暴力的方式，也就不奇怪了。然而，这仍然是“暴力心态下的产物，无论它如何鄙视所有公开的暴力，因为朝妥协（方向做出）的努力不是内驱而是从外部，为反对的努力所驱动的，因为没有强制性特征的妥协，无论如何自由地为人们所接受，是不可设想的。‘最好不然(It would be better othersise)’是潜在于一切妥协之下的情感。”——重要的是，议会的衰落也许已经使得，与为战争引向它（非暴力地解决政治冲突的理想）的同样多的心灵，疏离了非暴力解决政治冲突的理想。和平主义者遭遇了布尔什维克和公会主义者。这些，已经引起一种废止法律的，且总体上适当的对当前议会的批判。然而，无论一个兴盛的议会多么地可欲和可喜，关于原则上非暴力的政治协定（达成政治一致）的手段的讨论都不可能与议会主义(Parliamentarianism)相关。因为议会在重要事务上所能实现的，只可能是那些在起源和结果上说都伴随着暴力的法令。
Is any nonviolent resolution of conflict possible? Without doubt. The relationships among private persons are full of examples of this. Nonviolent agreement is possible wherever a civilized outlook allows the use of unalloyed means of agreement. Legal and illegal means of every kind that are all the same violent may be confronted with nonviolent ones as unalloyed means. Courtesy, sympathy, peaceableness, trust, and whatever else might here be mentioned are their subjective preconditions. Their objective manifestation, however, is determined by the law (whose enormous scope cannot be discussed here) that says unalloyed means are never those of direct solutions but always those of indirect solutions. They therefore never apply directly to the resolution of conflict between man and man, but apply only to matters concerning objects. The sphere of nonviolent means opens up in the realm of human conflicts relating to goods. For this reason, technique in the broadest sense of the word is their most particular area. Its profoundest example is perhaps the conference, considered as a technique of civil agreement. For in it not only is nonviolent agreement possible, but also the exclusion of violence in principle is quite explicitly demonstrable by one significant factor: there is no sanction for lying. Probably no legislation on earth originally stipulated such a sanction. This makes clear that there is a sphere of human agreement that is nonviolent to the extent that it is wholly inaccessible to violence: the proper sphere of "understanding," language. Only late and in a peculiar process of decay has it been penetrated by legal violence in the penalty placed on fraud. For whereas the legal system at its origin, trusting to its victorious power, is content to defeat lawbreaking wherever it happens to appear, and deception, having itself no trace of power about it, was, on the principle <i>ius civile vigilantibus scriptum est</i>, exempt from punishment in Roman and ancient Germanic law, the law of a later period, lacking confidence in its own violence, no longer felt itself a match for that of all others. Rather, fear of the latter and mistrust of itself indicate its declining vitality. It begins to set itself ends, with the intention of sparing law-preserving violence more taxing manifestations. It turns to fraud, therefore, not out of moral considerations but for fear of the violence that it might unleash in the defrauded party. Since such fear conflicts with the violent nature of law derived from its origins, such ends are inappropriate to the justified means of law. They reflect not only the decay of its own sphere but also a diminution of pure means. For in prohibiting fraud, law restricts the use of wholly nonviolent means because they could produce reactive violence. This tendency of law has also played a part in the concession of the right to strike, which contradicts the interests of the state. It grants this right because it forestalls violent actions the state is afraid to oppose. Did not workers previously resort at once to sabotage and set fire to factories?-To induce men to reconcile their interests peacefully without involving the legal system, there is, in the end, apart from all virtues, one effective motive that of ten enough puts into the most reluctant hands pure instead of violent means: it is the fear of mutual disadvantages that threaten to arise from violent confrontation, whatever the outcome might be. Such motives are clearly visible in countless cases of conflict of interests between private persons. It is different when classes and nations are in conflict, since the higher orders that threaten to overwhelm equally victor and vanquished are hidden from the feelings of most, and from the intelligence of almost all. Space does not here permit me to trace such higher orders and the common interests corresponding to them, which constitute the most enduring motive for a policy of pure means.4 We can therefore point only to pure means in politics as analogous to those which govern peaceful intercourse between private persons.
冲突的非暴力的解决方案可能么？的确。私人之间的关系抽充满了这样的例子。在任何一种文明的愿景允许使用纯粹的(unalloyed)协定手段的地方，非暴力的协定都是可能的。一切同样暴力的，（合）法律的或非法的手段都可能遭遇作为纯粹的手段的非暴力的手段。礼貌(courtesy)、同情(sympathy)、平和(peaceableness, 息事宁人)、信任和这里可能提到的其他的无论什么都是它们（非暴力的手段）的主观的先决条件。然而，它们的客观的显现，是为这样的法律（这里不可能就其庞大的范围进行讨论）——这样的法律说，纯粹的手段从来就不是那些带来直接的解决方案的手段，而永远是那些带来间接解决方案的手段——所决定的。因此它们绝不会直接地应用于人与人之间的冲突的解决，而只应用于关于客体/物件的问题。非暴力的手段的领域，是在与物品(goods, 商品)相关的人类冲突的领域中开启的。出于这个原因，技术，在这个词最广泛的意义上说，是它们最特别的领域。它最深刻的例子也许是会议(conference)，被认为是一种（达成）公民协定的会议。因为在其中不仅非暴力的协定/一致是可能的，而且，一个重要的要素也相当明显地展现了原则上对暴力的排除：不容许说谎。很可能大地上没有一种立法在一开始会规定这样一种许可（容许说谎）。这使这点变得清楚，即存在这样一个人类协定/一致的领域，它在它完全无法触及暴力的程度上说是非暴力的：（这个领域就是）“理解”，语言的专门领域。只是在后来，以及在特定的衰落的进程中，它才在置于欺诈头上的惩罚中，为（合）法律的暴力所贯穿。因为尽管法律系统，就其起源而言，依靠它胜利的力量，它满足于击败无论在哪里碰巧出现的违法现象；而欺骗，本身却没有关于它的权力的踪迹，由于ius civile vigilantibus scriptum est(“民法是为警戒者而书写的”)这一原则，而免于罗马法和古日耳曼法的惩罚——后来的时代的法律，则缺乏对它自己的暴力的自信，而不再感到自己可以和所有其他的暴力对抗。确切地说，对后者（其他暴力）的恐惧和对自身的不信任指出它衰落的活力。它开始为自己设定目的，意图避免过多地展示护法的暴力。因此，它转向欺诈，不是出于道德上的考虑，而是因为恐惧于欺诈可能在被欺诈一方引发的暴力。由于这种恐惧与法律的——源自其起源的——暴力本质/自然冲突，这样的目的对正当的法律手段来说，就是不合适的。它们不仅反映了它（法律）自己的领域的消退，也反映了纯粹的手段的缩减。因为在禁止欺诈的同时，法律也就限制了（对）完全非暴力的手段的使用，因为它们可能带来反动的(reactive)暴力。法律的这种趋势也在对罢工的权利的退让中起到了作用，后者是与国家的利益相抵触的。它许可这项权利，因为这项权利预防了国家害怕反对的暴力行动。难道之前工人们不会同时诉诸于怠工和在工厂纵火么？——为引导人们在不涉及法律系统的情况下和平地协调他们的利益，终于，在所有的德性之外，有一个动机，其足够频繁地在最不情愿的手中放入纯粹的而非暴力的手段：那就是，恐惧于那威胁着将从从暴力对抗中出现的相互不利，无论结果如何。这样的动机在数不胜数的私人之间利益冲突的案例中清晰可见。在阶级和民族冲突时情况则有所不同，因为威胁要同样征服胜利者和被征服者的更高的秩序隐而不见于大多数人的情感，以及几乎所有人的智力。这里的篇幅不允许我追溯这样的，更高的秩序和与之相应的共同的利益，而后者，则构成了纯粹手段之政策的最为持久的动机。因此我们只能指出，政治中的纯粹的手段，类似于那些统御私人间交际的手段。
As regards class struggles, in them strikes must under certain conditions be seen as a pure means. Two essentially different kinds of strikes, the possibilities of which have already been considered, must now be more fully characterized. Sorel has the credit-from political rather than purely theoretical considerations-of having first distinguished them. He contrasts them as the political strike and the proletarian general strike. They are also antithetical in their relation to violence. Of the partisans of the former he says, "The strengthening of state power is the basis of their conceptions; in their present organizations the politicians (namely, the moderate socialists) are already preparing the ground for a strong centralized and disciplined power that will be impervious to criticism from the opposition, and capable of imposing silence and issuing its mendacious decrees." 5 "The political general strike demonstrates how the state will lose none of its strength, how power is transferred from the privileged to the privileged, how the mass of producers will change their masters." In contrast to this political general strike (which incidentally seems to have been summed up by the abortive German revolution), the proletarian general strike sets itself the sole task of destroying state power. It "nullifies all the ideological consequences of every possible social policy; its partisans see even the most popular reforms as bourgeois." "This general strike clearly announces its indifference toward material gain through conquest by declaring its intention to abolish the state; the state was really ... the basis of the existence of the ruling group, who in all their enterprises benefit from the burdens borne by the public." Whereas the first form of interruption of work is violent, since it causes only an external modification of labor conditions, the second, as a pure means, is nonviolent. For it takes place not in readiness to resume work following external concessions and this or that modification to working conditions, but in the determination to resume only a wholly transformed work, no longer enforced by the state, an upheaval that this kind of strike not so much causes as consummates. For this reason, the first of these undertakings is lawmaking but the second anarchistic. Taking up occasional statements by Marx, Sorel rejects every kind of program, of utopia-in a word, of lawmaking-for the revolutionary movement: "With the general strike, all these fine things disappear; the revolution appears as a clear, simple revolt, and no place is reserved either for the sociologists or for the elegant amateurs of social reforms or for the intellectuals who have made it their profession to think for the proletariat."6 Against this deep, moral, and genuinely revolutionary conception, no objection can stand that seeks, on grounds of its possibly catastrophic consequences, to brand such a general strike as violent. Even if it can rightly be said that the modern economy, seen as a whole, resembles much less a machine that stands idle when abandoned by its stoker than a beast that goes berserk as soon as its tamer turns his back, nevertheless the violence of an action can be assessed no more from its effects than from its ends, but only from the law of its means. State power, of course, which has eyes only for effects, opposes precisely this kind of strike for its alleged violence, as distinct from partial strikes, which are for the most part actually extortionate. Sorel has explained, with highly ingenious arguments, the extent to which such a rigorous conception of the general strike per se is capable of diminishing the incidence of actual violence in revolutions.-By contrast, an outstanding example of violent omission, more immoral and cruder than the political general strike, akin to a blockade, is the strike by doctors, such as several German cities have seen. Here is revealed at its most repellent an unscrupulous use of violence which is positively depraved in a professional class that for years, without the slightest attempts at resistance, "secured death its prey," and then at the first opportunity abandoned life of its own free will. More clearly than in recent class struggles, the means of nonviolent agreement have developed in thou sands of years of the history of states. Only occasionally does the task of diplomats in their transactions consist of modifying legal systems. Funda mentally they must, entirely on the analogy of agreement between private persons, resolve conflicts case by case, in the name of their states, peacefully and without contracts. A delicate task that is more robustly performed by referees, but a method of solution that in principle is above that of the referee because it is beyond all legal systems and therefore beyond violence. Accordingly, like the intercourse of private persons, that of diplomats has engendered its own forms and virtues, which were not always mere formalities, even though they have become so.
至于阶级斗争，其中，罢工必须在特定的条件下才可被视为一种纯粹的手段。我们必须更加充分地总结本质上不同的两种罢工——我们已经考虑过这两种罢工的可能性——的特征。索雷尔的功劳——出于政治的而不是纯粹理论的考虑—就在于第一个对它们做出了区分。他对照了政治的罢工和无产阶级的总罢工。它们就其与暴力的关系而言也是对立的。对于前者的支持者他说，“国家权力的强化是他们的构想的基础；在他们当下的组织中政客们（也就是说，温和的社会主义者们）已经在为一个高度中心化和规训化的权力做准备了，这个权力，将不受来自反对方的批评的侵犯，并有能力强加沉默和发布它虚造的法令。”“政治的总罢工展示了国家将如何没有失去一丁点力量，权力是如何从特权者向特权者转移，生产者大众将如何更换他们的主子。”与这种政治的总罢工（看起来，这种罢工意外地为失败的德国革命所概括）相对地，无产阶级的总罢工给自己设立了这样一个唯一的任务：摧毁国家权力。它“使每个可能的社会政策的所有意识形态的效果变得无效；它的支持者们甚至把最得民意的改革也看作资产阶级的。”“通过宣布它的意图是消灭国家，这种总罢工清楚地宣告它对通过征服得来的物质收益的冷漠；国家实际上……是统治群体存在的基础，这些统治群体在其所有的生意中从公众承担的重负中获益。”尽管第一种中断工作的形式是暴力的，因为它只引起了一种对劳动条件的外部改进，第二种，作为一种纯粹的手段，则是非暴力的。因为其发生，并不是为了在有了外部的让步妥协和这样或那样的对工作条件改进之后而恢复工作，而是决定只恢复到一种完全变化了的，不再为国家所强加的工作，而这种剧变是由这种罢工与其说是导致的，不如说是使之圆满的。出于这个原因，这些计划中的第一个（政治的总罢工）是立法性的而第二个（无产阶级的总罢工）则是无政府主义的。索雷尔用马克思应景的陈述来反对一切种类的计划、乌托邦：“随着总罢工的出现，所有这些美好的东西都消失了；革命看起来成了一场清楚、单纯的反叛，它不再给社会学家或社会改革的高雅的爱好者或以为无产阶级思考为业的知识分子留下空间。”对于这个深刻、道德且真正革命性的概念，那些试图在它可能带来的灾难性后果的基础上，给这种总罢工打上暴力标签的反对意见，没有一种能够站得住脚。即便人们可以正确地说，被视为一个整体的现代经济，相较于在被它的锅炉工们抛弃时闲置的机器而言，更接近于一个只要其驯养人一转身就发狂的野兽，但一个行动的暴力，相较于从其目的而言不能更多地从其效果，而只能从其手段的法则来评估。当然，只顾及效果的国家权力，反对的正是这种罢工，因为它所宣称的暴力，而这区别于部分罢工，而部分罢工在很大程度上说实际是勒索性的。索雷尔已经用极其巧妙的论证解释了，在何种程度上这样一个关于总罢工的严格概念本身，能够在革命中减少实际的暴力发生。——相反，关于暴力的不作为（比政治总罢工更不道德也更加残酷，接近于封锁[blockade]）有一个突出例子，是医生的罢工，如同德国一些城市已经见证过的。这里，一种肆无忌惮的对暴力的使用，以最引人厌恶的形式显露出来了，这种对暴力的使用，对于一个职业群体来说是绝对堕落的，这个群体多年来，在没有遭遇丝毫抵抗的尝试的情况下，“确保死亡是它的猎物”，但在这时却第一次有机会出于它自己的自由意志而放弃生命。比在新近的阶级斗争中更清楚地，非暴力协定的手段已经在数千年的国家史中发展起来。只在偶尔，外交官在其事务中的任务才是修改法律系统。从根本上说他们必须——完全类似于私人之间的协定——逐一地，以他们的国家的名义，和平地，不用契约地解决冲突。一个更多地是由调停人所执行的精细任务，却也是一种原则上高于调停人之任务的解决方法，因为它超越所有法律系统并因此而超越了暴力。相应地，和私人的交际一样，外交官的交际已经生成了它自己的形式和德性，这并不总是单纯的礼节，即便它们已经变成这样。
Among all the forms of violence permitted by both natural law and positive law, not one is free of the gravely problematic nature, already indicated, of all legal violence. Since, however, every conceivable solution to human problems, not to speak of deliverance from the confines of all the world-historical conditions of existence obtaining hitherto, remains impossible if violence is totally excluded in principle, the question necessarily arises as to what kinds of violence exist other than all those envisaged by legal theory. It is at the same time a question of the truth of the basic dogma common to both theories: just ends can be attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends. How would it be, therefore, if all the violence imposed by fate, using justified means, were of itself in irreconcilable conflict with just ends, and if at the same time a different kind of violence arose that certainly could be either the justified or the unjustified means to those ends but was not related to them as means at all but in some different way? This would throw light on the curious and at first discouraging discovery of the ultimate insolubility of all legal problems (which in its hopelessness is perhaps comparable only to the possibility of conclusive pronouncements on "right" and "wrong" in evolving languages). For it is never reason that decides on the justification of means and the justness of ends: fate-imposed violence decides on the former, and God on the latter. An insight that is uncommon only because of the stubborn prevailing habit of conceiving those just ends as ends of a possible law-that is, not only as generally valid (which follows analytically from the nature of justice) but also as capable of generalization, which, as could be shown, contradicts the nature of justice. For ends that in one situation are just, universally acceptable, and valid are so in no other situation, no matter how similar the situations may be in other respects.-The nonmediate function of violence at issue here is illustrated by everyday experience. As regards man, he is impelled by anger, for example, to the most visible outbursts of a violence that is not related as a means to a preconceived end. It is not a means but a manifestation. Moreover, this violence has thoroughly objective manifestations in which it can be subjected to criticism. These are to be found, most significantly, above all in myth.
在所有形式的，为自然法和实证法所容许的暴力中，没有一种免于严重成问题的本质，再次指出，是所有的合法暴力中。然而，由于应对人类问题的一切可设想的解决方案——更不用说对存在至今获得的所有世界-历史的条件的限制的解脱——在假如暴力在原则上完全被排除的情况下仍然是不可能的，必然产生的疑问是，在所有那些法律理论设想过的暴力之外，还存在何种暴力。这同时也是一个关于对两种理论（自然法和实证法理论）来说的共同基本信条之真实性的问题：正义的目的只可能通过正当的手段来实现，而正当的手段则只用于正义的目的。因此，如果所有由命运强加的且使用正当手段的暴力，其本身却与正义的目的产生不可调和的冲突，以及如果同时又出现一种不同的暴力——这种暴力当然可能是达成正义目的的正当或不正当的手段，却根本不是作为手段与它们（那些正义的目的）相关，但是以某种不同的方式（与这些目的发生关系）——的话，它（那种暴力）应该是怎样的呢？这将在那个关于所有法律问题之最终不可解性的令人好奇且起初令人沮丧的发现（就其无望而言也许只能相比于在变化的语言中在“对”“错”上达成定论的可能性）上带来新的启发。因为绝不是理性来决定手段的正当性和目的的正义性：命运强加的暴力决定前者，而上帝则决定后者。这个洞见之所以不常见仅是因为这样一个顽固的流习，即把那些正义的目的设想为一种可能的法律的目的——也就是说，不仅设想为普遍有效的（从分析上这是随正义的本质而来的），还认为它们可以普世化，而这，可以被证明，与正义的本质相悖。因为在一个情景中是正义的、被普遍接受的和有效的目的，在其他的情景中并不如此，无论在其他的方面这些情景是多么地相似。——这里涉及的暴力的非中介的功能，可用日常经验来说明。至于人，他是在，比如说，愤怒的驱使下，才造成一种最为常见的暴力的爆发，这种暴力并非作为某种手段而与某个预设的目的相关。它不是一种手段而是一种显现。而且，这种暴力具有完全客观的显现，在这种显现中它可以服从于批判。这些，首先在神话中，表现得最为显著。
Mythic violence in its archetypal form is a mere manifestation of the gods. Not a means to their ends, scarcely a manifestation of their will, but primarily a manifestation of their existence. The legend of Niobe contains an outstanding example of this. True, it might appear that the action of Apollo and Artemis is only a punishment. But their violence establishes a law far more than it punishes the infringement of a law that already exists. Niobe's arrogance calls down fate upon her not because her arrogance offends against the law but because it challenges fate-to a fight in which fate must triumph and can bring to light a law only in its triumph. How little such divine violence was, to the ancients, the law-preserving violence of punishment is shown by the heroic legends in which the hero-for example, Prometheus-challenges fate with dignified courage, fights it with varying fortunes, and is not left by the legend without hope of one day bringing a new law to men. It is really this hero and the legal violence of the myth native to him that the public tries to picture even now in admiring the miscreant. Violence therefore bursts upon Niobe from the uncertain, ambiguous sphere of fate. It is not actually destructive. Although it brings a cruel death to Niobe's children, it stops short of claiming the life of their mother, whom it leaves behind, more guilty than before through the death of the children, both as an eternally mute bearer of guilt and as a boundary stone on the frontier between men and gods. If this immediate violence in mythic manifestations proves closely related, indeed identical, to lawmaking violence, it reflects a problematic light on lawmaking violence, insofar as the latter was characterized above, in the account of military violence, as merely a mediate violence. At the same time this connection promises to provide further illumination of fate, which in all cases underlies legal violence, and to conclude in broad outline the critique of the latter. For the function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be as law, but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is powermaking, assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate manifestation of violence. Justice is the principle of all divine endmaking, power the principle of all mythic lawmaking.
神话的暴力就其原型而言仅仅是众神的显现(manifestation，示威)。不是一种达成他们的目的的手段，也绝少是他们的意志的显现，而首先是他们的存在的显现。尼俄伯的传说就包含了关于这点的一个突出的例子。确实，表面上看，阿波罗和阿尔忒弥斯的行动只是一种惩罚。但远甚于对于对已有法律的侵犯的惩罚的是，他们的暴力确立了一种法律。尼俄伯的自大招致命运降临，这不是因为她的自大侵犯了法律而是因为它挑战了命运——这导致了这样的一场战斗，其中命运必将获胜且只能在它的胜利中公布一种法律。这样的英雄传说——其中，英雄（比如说，普罗米修斯）以高贵的勇气挑战命运，用各种运气来与之斗争，传说总是给他们留下了在将来某天给人们带来新法的希望——展示了，对古人来说，这种神的暴力在多小的程度上成为护法性的惩罚之暴力。公众——甚至现在——试图在对恶棍的钦佩中形绘的，实际上就是这种英雄和这种原生于(native to)他的，神话的法律的暴力。因此，暴力是从命运那未知的、模棱两可的领域突然降临到尼俄伯头上的。它实际上并不是破坏性的。尽管它给尼俄伯的孩子们带来了残酷的死亡，它却没有进而索取他们的母亲的生命，它把她留在身后，通过孩子们的死亡，使她变得比以往更加负罪，（现在她）既是一个永远沉默的，罪的承载着，也是人与众神之间的边界上的一块界石。如果事实证明，神话的展现中这种直接暴力与立法暴力密切相关于，其实是等同于，立法暴力的话，那么，它反映出一道问题之光于立法性暴力上（即，从这个角度出来对立法性暴力的理解——译注）——就后者在上文，对军事暴力的描述中，被描写为为仅仅是一种中介性暴力而言。同时，这种关联也承诺为命运提供进一步的说明——在所有情况中，后者都潜在于法律的暴力之下——并在大致的轮廓上总结对后者的批判。因为，在这个意义上说——即立法，用作为手段的暴力，把有待确立为法律的东西当作它的目的来追求，但在安置(instatement，法律就位)的时刻却没有放弃暴力；相反，就在立法的那一刻，它具体来说确立为法律的并不是某个不掺杂暴力的纯粹目的，而是一个在权力的头衔下，必然与之密切相关的目的——立法暴力的功能是双重的。立法就是立权(powermaking)，是对权力的假定，并且达到了这样的程度——它就是暴力的直接的展现。正义是所有的神的终端标记(endmaking)的原则，而权力则是所有的神话的立法的原则。
An application of the latter that has immense consequences is found in constitutional law. For in this sphere the establishing of frontiers, the task of "peace" after all the wars of the mythic age, is the primal phenomenon of all lawmaking violence. Here we see most clearly that power, more than the most extravagant gain in property, is what is guaranteed by all lawmaking violence. Where frontiers are decided, the adversary is not simply annihilated; indeed, he is accorded rights even when the victor's superiority in power is complete. And these are, in a demonically ambiguous way, "equal" rights: for both parties to the treaty, it is the same line that may not be crossed. Here appears, in a terribly primitive form, the mythic ambiguity of laws that may not be "infringed"-the same ambiguity to which Anatole France refers satirically when he says, "Poor and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under the bridges." It also appears that Sorel touches not merely on a cultural-historical truth but also on a metaphysical truth when he surmises that in the beginning all right was the prerogative of kings or nobles-in short, of the mighty; and that, mutatis mutandis, it will remain so as long as it exists. For from the point of view of violence, which alone can guarantee law, there is no equality, but at the most equally great violence. The act of establishing frontiers, however, is also significant for an understanding of law in another respect. Laws and circumscribed frontiers remain, at least in primeval times, unwritten laws. A man can unwittingly infringe upon them and thus incur retribution. For each intervention of law that is provoked by an offense against the unwritten and unknown law is called "retribution" (in contradistinction to "punishment"). But however unluckily it may befall its unsuspecting victim, its occurrence is, in the understanding of the law, not chance, but fate showing itself once again in its deliberate ambiguity. Hermann Cohen, in a brief reflection on the ancients' conception of fate, has spoken of the "inescapable realization" that it is "fate's orders themselves that seem to cause and bring about this infringement, this offense."7 Even the modern principle that ignorance of a law is not protection against punishment testifies to this spirit of law, just as the struggle over written law in the early period of the ancient Greek communities should be understood as a rebellion against the spirit of mythic statutes.
在宪法中我们可以发现（对）后一个原则的应用，它带来了巨大的后果。因为在这个领域中边界的确立，在神话时代的所有战争后的“和平”的任务，就是所有立法性的暴力的原始现象。这里我们最为清楚地看到，所有立法性的暴力保障的，是权力——（在这方面权力）远甚于在财产方面最过度的收益。在边界得以确立的地方，对手不仅被消灭；实际上，他也被赋予了权利，即便胜利者在权力上的优越性是使全面的。而这些（边界），在一个魔力般地模棱两可的方面，是“平等”的权利：对双方来说，对条约而言，它是同一条不可跨越的界线。不可（被）“侵犯”的法律的神话式的模棱两可——即阿纳托尔·法郎士在说“穷人和富人都平等地/同样被禁止在桥上过夜”时讽喻的那同一种模棱两可——，也以一种极其原始的形式，在这里出现了。看起来，在他推测在一开始的时候所有的权利都是国王或贵族，简言之，即强者的特权；而且通过必要的变通(mutatis mutandis)，只要它存在，它就会一直如此的时候，索雷尔也不仅触及了一种文化-历史的真理，更触及一种形而上学的真理。因为从暴力——它独力保障法律（法律仅由暴力保障）——的观点出发，平等并不存在，最多也只有等量的暴力。然而，确立边界的行动，对（我们）从另一个方面来理解法律来说，也是有意义的。法律和限界依然是——至少在原始时代——不成文的法律。一个人可能会不知不觉地侵犯它们并因此而招致报复(retribution)。因为为对不成文的和未知的法律的冒犯所引起的法律的一切干涉都被称作“报复”（区别于“惩罚”）。但无论它可能多么不幸地降临在它毫无准备的受害者头上，它的发生，就对法律的理解而言，都不是偶然，而是命运再次在它蓄意的模棱两可中展示自身。赫尔曼·科亨(Hermann Cohen)，在关于古人对命运之构想的简明思考中，已经说到了“不可逃避的实现”，即“正是命运的命令本身，看起来引起了和带来了这种侵犯，这种冒犯。”甚至现代的原则，即对法律的无知也不能保护人们免于惩罚，也证明了法律的这种精神，就像在古希腊共同体早期，在成文法上的斗争应当理解为一种对神话式的法令的反叛那样。
Far from inaugurating a purer sphere, the mythic manifestation of immediate violence shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal violence, and turns suspicion concerning the latter into certainty of the perniciousness of its historical function, the destruction of which thus becomes obligatory. This very task of destruction poses again, ultimately, the question of a pure immediate violence that might be able to call a halt to mythic violence. Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood. The legend of Niobe may be contrasted with God's judgment on the company of Korah, as an example of such violence. God's judgment strikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat, and does not stop short of annihilation. But in annihilating it also expiates, and a profound connection between the lack of bloodshed and the expiatory character of this violence is unmistakable. For blood is the symbol of mere life. The dissolution of legal violence stems (as cannot be shown in detail here) from the guilt of more natural life, which consigns the living, innocent and unhappy, to a retribution that "expiates" the guilt of mere life-and doubtless also purifies the guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law. For with mere life, the rule of law over the living ceases. Mythic violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake; divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice; the second accepts it.
与开创一个更加纯粹的领域远远相反，神话式的，直接的暴力的展现表明，它自己在根本上等同于所有法律的暴力，它还把对后者的怀疑，转变为对其历史功能之危害性的肯定，因此，对后者的破坏也成了必须。这种破坏的任务，再一次地，从根本上提出了，那种也许能够叫停神话暴力的纯粹的直接暴力的问题。就像上帝在所有领域反对神话那样，神话式的暴力也遭到了神的对抗。后者在所有方面构成了它的反题。如果说神话暴力是立法性，那么，神圣暴力就是灭法性的；如果说前者设定边界，那么，后者就无尽地破坏它们；如果说神话式的暴力同时带来罪孽与报复，那么，神的力量则只是补偿(expiates)；如果说前者带来威胁，那么后者则是打击；如果说前者是血腥的，那么后者则是不流血地致死。尼俄伯的传说可以和这种暴力之一例作为对比，即上帝对可拉的伙伴们的审判。上帝的审判打击了享有特权的利未人，在不加警示、不加威胁的情况下对他们进行打击，且并不止步于消灭。但在消灭的同时它也在补偿，而杀戮的缺乏和这种暴力的补偿的特征之间的那一深刻关联是清楚无疑的。因为血是纯粹生命的象征。法律的暴力的瓦解根源于（这里不可能详细展示这点）更加自然的生命的罪，后者把无知且苦恼的生者，发落给一种“补偿”单纯生命之罪的报复——而无疑，它（这种罪）也净化了罪人，不是罪的罪人，而是法律的罪人。因为伴随着纯粹的生命，法律凌驾于生者之上的统治也随之而结束了。神话暴力是凌驾于纯粹的生命之上的，只为其自身的，血腥力量；神圣暴力是凌驾于所有生命之上的，为生者的纯粹的力量。前者要求牺牲；后者接受牺牲。
This divine power is not only attested by religious tradition but is also found in present-day life in at least one sanctioned manifestation. The educative power, which in its perfected form stands outside the law, is one of its manifestations. These are defined, therefore, not by miracles directly performed by God but by the expiating moment in them that strikes without bloodshed, and, finally, by the absence of all lawmaking. To this extent it is justifiable to call this violence, too, annihilating; but it is so only relatively, with regard to goods, right, life, and suchlike, never absolutely, with regard to the soul of the living.-The premise of such an extension of pure or divine power is sure to provoke, particularly today, the most violent reactions, and to be countered by the argument that, if taken to its logical conclusion, it confers on men even lethal power against one another. This, however, cannot be conceded. For the question "May I kill?" meets its irreducible answer in the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." This commandment precedes the deed, just as God was "preventing" the deed. But just as it may not be fear of punishment that enforces obedience, the injunction becomes inapplicable, incommensurable, once the deed is accomplished. No judgment of the deed can be derived from the commandment. And so neither the divine judgment nor the grounds for this judgment can be known in advance. Those who base a condemnation of all violent killing of one person by another on the commandment are therefore mistaken. It exists not as a criterion of judgment, but as a guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it. Thus it was understood by Judaism, which expressly rejected the condemnation of killing in self-defense.-But those thinkers who take the opposite view refer to a more distant theorem, on which they possibly propose to base even the commandment itself. This is the doctrine of the sanctity of life, which they either apply to all animal and even vegetable life, or limit to human life. Their argument, exemplified in an extreme case by the revolutionary killing of the oppressor, runs as follows: "If I do not kill, I shall never establish the world dominion of justice ... that is the argument of the intelligent terrorist.... We, however, profess that higher even than the happiness and justice of existence stands existence itself."8 As certainly as this last proposition is false, indeed ignoble, it shows the necessity of seeking the reason for the commandment no longer in what the deed does to the victim, but in what it does to God and the doer. The proposition that existence stands higher than a just existence is false and ignominious, if existence is to mean nothing other than mere life-and it has this meaning in the argument ref erred to. It contains a mighty truth, however, if "existence," or, better, "life" (words whose ambiguity is readily dispelled, like that of "freedom," when they are used with reference to two distinct spheres), means the irreducible, total condition that is "man"; if the proposition is intended to mean that the nonexistence of man is something more terrible than the (admittedly subordinate) not-yet-attained condition of the just man. The proposition quoted above owes its plausibility to this ambiguity. Man cannot, at any price, be said to coincide with the mere life in him, any more than it can be said to coincide with any other of his conditions and qualities, including even the uniqueness of his bodily person. However sacred man is (or however sacred that life in him which is identically present in earthly life, death, and afterlife), there is no sacredness in his condition, in his bodily life vulnerable to injury by his fellow men. What, then, distinguishes it essentially from the life of animals and plants? And even if these were sacred, they could not be so by virtue only of being alive, of being in life. It might be well worthwhile to track down the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of life. Perhaps, indeed probably, it is relatively recent, the last mistaken attempt of the weakened Western tradition to seek the saint it has lost in cosmological impenetrability. (The antiquity of all religious commandments against murder is no counterargument, because these are based on ideas other than the modern theorem.) Finally, this idea of man's sacredness gives grounds for reflection that what is here pronounced sacred was, according to ancient mythic thought, the marked bearer of guilt: life itself.
这种神力不仅为宗教的传统所证明，也可以在今天的生活中，在至少一种被认可的展现中找到。教育的力量，以其完满的形式立足于法律之外，是它的（神的暴力）展现的一种。因此，这些展现，不是由上帝直接施展的奇迹所界定，而是由它们（奇迹）中不流血地打击的补偿性时刻，并最终，由所有立法的缺席所界定。在这个程度上说，有理由把这种暴力，也叫做废止性的；但它，只是相对地在涉及商品、权利、生命等这样的东西的时候，才如此，从不是绝对的，在涉及生者的灵魂的时候。——这种纯粹的或者说神圣暴力之扩展的前提，特别在今天，当然会引起最为暴力的反动，并且会遭到这样的反对论证，即，如果推到逻辑的结论上，它甚至会给人相互致死的力量。然而，这一点不可能得到承认。因为“我可以杀人么？”这个问题在“你不可杀人”的戒律中遇到了它不可化约的回答。这个戒律先于行动，就像上帝在“预防”行动。但正如同，可能并不是对惩罚的恐惧强迫了服从，一旦行为得以实现，这一禁令也变得不可应用、无从比较了。从这个戒令不可能导出任何关于行动的判断/审判。所以，无论是神的审判，还是这种审判的根据，都不可能被预先得知。因此，那些把对所有一个人对另一人的暴力杀戮的谴责建立在戒律基础之上的人，都弄错了。它（这一戒律）的存在不是作为一种判断的标准，而是作为个人或共同体的行动指导，而这些个人或共同体不得不独自与之搏斗，并且在例外的情况下，自行承担忽视它的责任。犹太教就是这么理解的，这种理解明确拒绝对自卫杀人的谴责。——但那些持相反观点的思考者提到了一种更加遥远的定律，他们可能打算把乃至戒律本身也建基于这一定律之上。这就是生命神圣（不可侵犯）的学说，他们要么把它应用于所有动物甚至植物生命之上，要么把它限于人类的生命。他们的论证——以对压迫者的革命杀戮这一极端例子为典型——是这样的：“如果我不杀人，我就不可能建立正义的世界统治（正义对世界的统治）……这就是那些聪明的恐怖分子的论证……而我们，承认存在本身甚至高于存在的幸福与正义。”<span class="note"><a href="zhushi.html#notea8" id="note8">[8]</a></span>和后一个命题的错误——实际上是可耻的——一样确定的是，它显示了有必要去为戒律寻找理由于，不是在（杀戮）行为对受害者所做的事情中，而是在它对上帝和（杀戮的）施行者带来的影响中。这个命题，即存在比正义的存在的地位更高，是错误而可耻的，如果（这里的）存在的意谓仅仅是纯粹的生命的话——而在上文提到的论证中它确实有这个意思。然而，它包含一个有力的真理，如果说“存在”，或者，说“生命”（在这些词被用来指涉两个相互区分的领域的时候，它们的模棱两可已经被毫不犹豫地消除了，就像“自由”一词那样）更好，意谓的是“人”之为人的不可还原的、总体的条件的话；如果这个命题意在说明人的非存在是某种比（一般认为是从属的）尚未取得的，正义之人的条件更糟糕的东西的话。上面引用的那个命题的表面上的合理性得益于这种模棱两可。无论如何，不能说人，等同于他身上的纯粹的生命，同样也不能说他等同于他的境况和品质中的任何一种，甚至包括他身体人格的独特性。无论人多么神圣（或者说无论人身上的生命——在此世的生命、死亡和后世中同样在场的生命——多么神圣），他的境况/条件，他的易受他的人类同胞伤害的身体性的生命并无神圣可言。那么，从本质上区分动物的生命和植物的生命的是什么？而即便这些东西是神圣的，它们也不可能仅因为活着，仅因为存在于生命之中就是这样。追溯生命之神圣性的信条的起源可能是很有价值的。也许，实际上也很可能，它是弱化的西方传统在寻找它丢失在了宇宙论之深奥中的圣人(the saint，神圣，这里指现代西方传统中神圣性的丧失——译注)的，相对晚近的，最后一次错误的尝试。（拥有反对谋杀的所有宗教戒律的古人并不成其为反驳的理由，因为这些东西是建立在观念而不是现代的定律的基础之上的。）最后，这种关于人的神圣性的观念也为这样的反思奠定了基础：这里被宣告为神圣的，根据古代的神话思想，乃是被标记的罪的承载者：生命本身。
The critique of violence is the philosophy of its history-the "philosophy" of this history because only the idea of its development makes possible a critical, discriminating, and decisive approach to its temporal data. A gaze directed only at what is close at hand can at most perceive a dialectical rising and falling in the lawmaking and law-preserving forms of violence. The law governing their oscillation rests on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence it represents, by suppressing hostile counterviolence. (Various symptoms of this have been referred to in the course of this study.) This lasts until either new forces or those earlier suppressed triumph over the hitherto lawmaking violence and thus found a new law, destined in its turn to decay. On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythic forms of law, on the suspension of law with all the forces on which it depends as they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new historical epoch is founded. If the rule of myth is broken occasionally in the present age, the coming age is not so unimaginably remote that an attack on law is altogether futile. But if the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes proof that revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and shows by what means. Less possible and also less urgent for humankind, however, is to decide when unalloyed violence has been realized in particular cases. For only mythic violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such with certainty, unless it be in incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is invisible to men. Once again all the eternal forms are open to pure divine violence, which myth bastardized with law. Divine violence may manifest itself in a true war exactly as it does in the crowd's divine judgment on a criminal. But all mythic, lawmaking violence, which we may call "executive," is pernicious. Pernicious, too, is the law-preserving, "administrative" violence that serves it. Divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred dispatch, may be called "sovereign" violence.
暴力的批判是其历史的哲学——这个历史的“哲学”——因为只有关于它的发展的观念，才能使一条切入其时间数据(temporal data)的批判性的、有辨别力的和决定性的进路成为可能。一种只关注周遭近物的目光至多只能感知到暴力的立法与护法形式中的一种辩证起落。统御它们震荡的法则，在于这样的环境，即所有护法暴力，在它持续期间，都会间接削弱它代表/表征/再现的立法暴力，通过压迫敌对的反暴力的方式。（在本研究的过程中已经提到了关于此的多种症候。）这会一直持续下去，直到要么新的武力要么那些之前被压迫的武力战胜了到那直至今时的立法暴力并因此而建立新法律，而这新法律注定也要消亡。在打破这个为神话式的法律所维持的循环，用法律像它们（武力）依赖它一样依赖它们的所有武力来悬置法律，并因此而最终消灭国家权力的时候，一个新的历史纪元得以创立。如果说在当下的时代中，神话的统治不时地被打破的话，那么，未来的时代也不会如此难以想象地遥远，以至于对法律的攻击也变得全然无效。但如果外在于法律的暴力的存在，作为纯粹的直接的暴力，得到保障的话，那么，这就提供了这一证据：革命的暴力，人对纯粹的暴力的最高级的展现，是可能的，并且还会展示用什么办法（来展现这种暴力）。然而，对人类来说，不那么可能也不那么紧急的是，去确定在特定的情况下，纯粹的暴力将于何时成为现实。因为只有神话暴力，而不是神圣暴力——除非它产生了无与伦比的效果——才会被确定地被承认为这样的暴力，因为暴力的补偿性力量对人来说是不可见的。再一次地，所有永恒的形式都对纯粹的神圣暴力开放，而神话则用法律来假冒它（神圣暴力）。神的暴力可以在一场真正的战争中——正如它在人群对罪犯的神圣审判中那样——自我展现。但所有神话的、立法的暴力——我们可以称之为“执行性的(executive)”——都是有害的。服务它的护法性的，“行政性(administrative)”暴力，也是有害的。神的暴力，之为神圣调度(sacred dispatch)的符号和封印，而绝不是其手段，可被称作“至高的”暴力。