巴特勒
权力的精神生活 Douban
author: 朱迪斯·巴特勒 translator: 张生 publishing house: 江苏人民出版社 2009 - 1
《权力的精神生活:服从的理论》对黑格尔、尼采、弗洛伊德、福柯、阿尔杜塞等有关服从理论的论述进行了比较研究,以读书笔记的形式阐述了作者对服从的观点:权力在主体的屈从与生产中的双重作用与权力所采取的精神形式。作为权力的一种形式,服从是自相矛盾的。被一种外在于自身的权力所支配是权力所采取的一种熟悉的和苦恼的形式。但是,为了发现“某人”是什么,某人作为一个主体的形成,所依赖的权利却完全是另一种权力。按照福柯的说法,如果我们理解了权力同样形成了主体,它就提供了它存在的条件和它欲望的轨迹。权力不仅仅是我们的存在所依靠的东西,它也形成了自反性。利用黑格尔、尼采、弗洛伊德、福柯和阿尔杜塞,这本富有挑战性和明晰的著作提供了主体形成的理论,它阐明了矛盾的社会权利的精神作用。
April 23, 2024 read
如何不仅仅是从所被作为对象的思想史里析出一种特定的主体化模式,而且还要为一个大写的主体化提供某种(亦或同时包含一个主体的发生学的)微观描述?或许德勒茲用“褶子”来说明了后一个问题;而巴特勒则选择再次(反动地)在黑格尔与精神分析的道路上去重写尼采,阿尔都塞,等等:内疚、苦恼意识,传唤,等等。只是前者总是朝向着某一具体的历史褶皱,而后者似乎在寻找一个普遍性心理说明(在2005中,巴特勒重新意识到了这个意义上福柯与尼采的距离)

但是我想从福柯的角度可以对后面一个问题是否成立提出这样一个疑问,即,他真的需要一个去历史的大写的主体化吗;他又真的没有在无论是“说真话”还是“规训”里给出诸多不同且具体的有关主体化的分析吗?
巴特勒 哲学
Giving an Account of Oneself Douban Goodreads
author: Judith Butler publishing house: Fordham University Press 2005 - 11
What does it mean to lead a moral life?In her first extended study of moral philosophy, Judith Butler offers a provocative outline for a new ethical practice-one responsive to the need for critical autonomy and grounded in a new sense of the human subject.Butler takes as her starting point one's ability to answer the questions What have I done?and What ought I to do?She shows that these question can be answered only by asking a prior question, Who is this 'I' who is under an obligation to give an account of itself and to act in certain ways?Because I find that I cannot give an account of myself without accounting for the social conditions under which I emerge, ethical reflection requires a turn to social theory.In three powerfully crafted and lucidly written chapters, Butler demonstrates how difficult it is to give an account of oneself, and how this lack of self-transparency and narratibility is crucial to an ethical understanding of the human. In brilliant dialogue with Adorno, Levinas, Foucault, and other thinkers, she eloquently argues the limits, possibilities, and dangers of contemporary ethical thought.Butler offers a critique of the moral self, arguing that the transparent, rational, and continuous ethical subject is an impossible construct that seeks to deny the specificity of what it is to be human. We can know ourselves only incompletely, and only in relation to a broader social world that has always preceded us and already shaped us in ways we cannot grasp. If inevitably we are partially opaque to ourselves, how can giving an account of ourselves define the ethical act? And doesn't an ethical system that holds us impossibly accountable for full self-knowledge and self-consistency inflict a kind of psychic violence, leading to a culture of self-beratement and cruelty? How does the turn to social theory offer us a chance to understand the specifically social character of our own unknowingness about ourselves?In this invaluable book, by recasting ethics as a project in which being ethical means becoming critical of norms under which we are asked to act, but which we can never fully choose, Butler illuminates what it means for us as fallible creaturesto create and share an ethics of vulnerability, humility, and ethical responsiveness. Judtith Butler is the Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. The most recent of her books are Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence and Undoing Gender.
May 7, 2024 read
第2章的注4里巴特勒主动提到了一个未被采用的区分,其来自德勒茲的morality与ethics:前者被说成是价值与判断的而指向着某种超越性;后者则为对存在样态之潜能的自问而指向着某种内在性。这一区分或许在本书这样黑格尔式的曲折——说,由于下面这些关系以及对它们作为自述/自我说明之基础的认识,即,自述/自我说明总是,面向他者、回应传唤、有着其前历史与前存在论、发生于具体的一个历史-社会环境、其不透明的认识中混杂着差异与断裂、支付着代价,所以我们或许可以在对(阿多诺指出的)以普遍性为特征的伦理暴力的批判——以外开辟另一个可能,即,作为,对治理与服从的先天拒绝=去屈从化(désassujettissement),的批判
巴特勒 哲学